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System justification theory proposes that people are motivated to perceive the existing social system as fair, 
legitimate, and desirable. However, status-legitimacy effect, understood as the most disadvantaged living in the 
most unequal contexts experiencing this need most strongly, has only found mixed support in empirical works. 
This article presents a comprehensive test of the original reading of status-legitimacy hypothesis which implied 
that those with lower objective status are the most motivated to system justify and of the respecified version 
that posits subjective powerlessness to be the driver of undue system legitimization. Multilevel mixed-effects 
linear regression analysis of International Social Survey Programme modules on social inequality, covering 
almost 50,000 respondents from 28 countries, shows that the mean effects of both subjective and objective status 
are in line with predictions of economic rationality. To model contextual inequality, we distinguish between 
an objective measure, Gini, and perceived amounts of income differences as reported by respondents. The 
analysis testing contextual moderation lends support for the original reading of status-legitimacy hypothesis—
the objectively, rather than subjectively, disadvantaged experience greater motivation to defend the system.
KEY WORDS: legitimacy, system justification theory, social status, subjective status, inequality
It has long been considered paradoxical that many people of lower social or economic status 
support the very social arrangements which offer them only questionable utility—whether by em-
bracing ideologies that defend the status quo, rejecting suggestions of change, or by citing justifi-
cations for existing inequalities that place themselves and their groups in further disadvantage (e.g., 
Hochschild, 1981; Lane, 1959).
Offering a solution to this apparent puzzle, system justification theory (SJT) proposes that peo-
ple are motivated to perceive the standing social and economic arrangements as fair and legitimate 
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(Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004) and that this motivation to be especially strong among those facing 
the greatest disadvantages, in particular in situations when personal and group interests are not made 
explicit or salient and in societies and cultures that put emphasis of meritocratic ideologies akin to 
protestant work ethic (Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003). On the other hand, evidence for 
a robust negative relationship between socioeconomic position and active psychological legitimi-
zation of the system, dubbed status-legitimacy hypothesis by Brandt (2013), is mixed (Brandt & 
Reyna, 2012; Henry & Saul, 2006). A review of related research highlights two possible reasons for 
these divergent findings. First, conceptualizations and measures of perceived system legitimacy vary 
across extant studies. While some authors theorize that heightened motivation to legitimize experi-
enced inequality should be tied to specific dissonance-generating hierarchies (Sengupta, Osborne, & 
Sibley, 2015; Trump & White, 2015), others assert or assume that motivation to defend the system 
may be satiated by legitimizing multiple system-justifying beliefs or symbols (Brandt, 2013; Jost et 
al., 2011; van der Toorn et al., 2015). Second, neither the original formulation of the status-legiti-
macy hypothesis nor any of its subsequent tests do explicitly and systematically distinguish between 
objective and subjective status.
In this article, we present a comprehensive test of two readings of status-legitimacy hypothesis 
using representative cross-cultural data gathered from three rounds of Social Inequality modules of 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) which provide a unique opportunity to distinguish 
between judgments and beliefs about actual levels of earnings inequalities and the values the respon-
dents would find legitimate. Assessing whether subjective feeling of powerlessness could explain 
paradoxical behaviors among members of the lower strata, we put emphasis on the differences be-
tween the likely subjective and objective experiences and on differences between measures of sub-
jectively perceived and objective contextual inequality. Thus, the present research examines whether 
people with lower objective or subjective status react counterintuitively within contexts which are 
objectively or subjectively experienced as unequal. In addition, we also open a question of whether 
it is overall high-levels of or medium-term changes in contextual inequality that are associated with 
increased acceptance of earnings inequalities among the disadvantaged.
Theoretical Background
Irrational Actors
The enigma motivating this article is that of lower-class voters endorsing right-wing economic 
attitudes, thus diverging from expected behavior of an economically rational voter summed up by 
Meltzer and Richards’ (1981) well-known median-voter theorem. In general, research shows people 
with higher economic status expressing less egalitarian views compared to those with lower incomes 
and lower self-reported social positions, but the reported relationships are far from sufficient to cast 
people as omniscient utility monsters (Gijsberts, 2002; Kenworthy & McCall, 2008; Kuhn, 2011).
Painting a more complex picture, subjective beliefs about one’s situation, rather than objective 
economic conditions, were proposed as drivers of economic attitudes (Kreidl, 2000; Loveless & 
Whitefield, 2011). For instance, Brown-Iannuzzi, Lundberg, Kay, and Payne (2015) showed that 
experimentally manipulated subjective status was negatively related to attitudes towards redistri-
bution even in cases when participants could not profit from holding such attitudes in the particular 
experimental game, and studies including perceptions of life-long and contextual risks show that 
even prospects of upward mobility lead members of lower classes to reject redistribution (Bénabou 
& Ok, 2001; Cojocaru, 2014). Furthermore, individuals may operate with inaccurate data, whether in 
regard to estimates of actual differences in wealth and incomes (Kelley & Zagorski, 2004; Norton & 
Ariely, 2011), potential for social mobility (Jaime-Castillo & Marqués-Perales, 2014; Kraus & Tan, 
2015), or performance of the welfare state (van Oorschot & Meuleman, 2012). Finally, people may 
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also have skewed perceptions of both the actual structure and of realistically attainable and desirable 
alternatives (e.g., relative deprivation; Evans & Kelley, 2017).
Moreover, actors may also value goals other than personal material self-interest (Alesina & 
Angeletos, 2005). For instance, dominant ideology thesis suggests that people adopt ideologies (and 
thus goals and values) that are pervasive in their particular contexts (Kluegel & Smith, 1986). As 
Castillo (2007) explains, dominant ideologies usually provide justifications and explanations for 
the structure and power relations that are observable within the given society, reduce the need to use 
force in order to maintain the standing group hierarchies (Rytina et al., 1970), and instill the “right” 
values and beliefs among the members of the public (Wegener & Liebig, 1995). It is then the ques-
tion of adoption of the “right” values instead of “challenging beliefs” among the lower strata that 
social scientists are puzzled about (Sennett & Cobb, 1973).
In this regard, the rest of the article focuses on a proposition derived from system justification 
theory that people are psychologically motivated to perceive their social surroundings as just and fair, 
and thus they have a tendency to adopt justifications and explanations for the structure and power 
relations observable within the given society and, sometimes, even when adoption of such explana-
tions does not conform to expectations of economic rationality (Jost et al., 2004; van der Toorn & 
Jost, 2014). This motivation is then theorized to facilitate the adoption of dominant ideologies as 
a bottom-up mechanism—complementing the top-down mechanisms of dissemination of ideology 
(e.g., Gramsci, 2000; Lukács, 1971).
System Justification: Motivation to See the Social World as Fair
In general, SJT proposes that people are psychologically motivated have favorable beliefs about 
the system in which they live in and to consider this system to be just, legitimate, and desirable (Jost 
et al., 2011; van der Toorn, Tyler, & Jost, 2011). This is motivated mainly by existential needs to feel 
safe, epistemological needs to reduce uncertainty and gain control of own future, and relational needs 
of interacting with those who share the same social system (Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Jost, Ledgerwood, 
& Hardin, 2008). System-justifying tendencies are predicted to be stronger among those in disadvan-
taged (or low status) positions (Jost et al., 2004), and those who perceive the system as durable and 
stable (Laurin, Gaucher, & Kay, 2013). Furthermore, system-justification tendencies can be elicited 
and heightened in certain circumstances: (1) when system is perceived to be under threat; (2) when 
people see themselves as dependent on the system and see the system as inescapable; and (3) when 
people (implicitly) feel to have little control over their lives (Kay & Friesen, 2011).
Status and Support of the System: The Status-Legitimacy Hypothesis
Building on previous work and engaging with the concept of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 
1957), Jost et al. (2003) derived further predictions inspired by SJT. The originally proposed sta-
tus-legitimacy hypothesis posits that those facing the greatest disadvantages may be among the most 
ardent supporters of the system in place since they experience the greatest dissonance. According to 
SJT, members of high- and low-status groups experience different levels of cognitive dissonance be-
cause the members of low-status groups have to reconcile whether they deserve to be in a disadvan-
taged position and whether to continue supporting the system which put them in such a position in the 
first place. In order to reduce cognitive dissonance, one may opt to cede positive self or group image 
and bolster the legitimacy of the system. As SJT does not dispute presence and strength of other mo-
tivations, status-legitimacy effect should manifest only when (1) self-interest and group membership 
of the individual are not made salient and obvious; (2) the individual has a reason to believe that they 
are at least partially responsible for the perpetuation of the system; and (3) the dominant system-jus-
tifying ideology and stereotypes are (similar to) meritocratic and Protestant work-ethic ideas. Since 
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more unequal systems should present members of low-status with more dissonance to reconcile, 
status-legitimacy effect was predicted to be stronger in societies with higher levels of contextual 
inequality. This prediction, named status-legitimacy hypothesis by Brandt (2013), distinguishes SJT 
from competing theories of social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and social dominance (Sidanius 
& Pratto, 1999), which also expect people to utilize legitimizing stereotypes for explanations of un-
equal group hierarchies but, nevertheless, predict that the low-status individuals should be rejecting 
the unfavorable system.
The original article of Jost et al. (2003) supported the status-legitimacy hypothesis with five 
different studies using various indicators of objective status and support of the system. Further cor-
roboration came from Henry and Saul (2006) who studied system-justifying attitudes among dis-
advantaged children in Bolivia. However, other studies failed to find conclusive evidence for the 
status-legitimacy effect (e.g., Brandt & Reyna, 2012; Trump & White, 2015). The most comprehen-
sive empirical critique of the proposed status-legitimacy hypothesis was brought forward by Brandt 
(2013) in an analysis of samples from over 50 countries in World Values Survey data and additional 
40  years worth of samples from the General Social Survey and the American National Election 
Study. In particular, the tested interpretation of status-legitimacy hypothesis was that measures of 
both objective (age, gender, income, level education, race) and subjective status (self-assessed social 
class) should be in negative relationship with perceived legitimacy of the system (operationalized 
akin to institutional trust) and that these relationships would be stronger in more unequal countries. 
The study concludes mostly null and negative results for individual indicators of status and puts the 
very existence of the supposed anomaly into question.
Two explanations were put forward in order to reconcile the divergent findings. Focusing on 
the dependent variable, Sengupta et al. (2015) proposed that it is only the particular social hierarchy 
responsible for the experienced dissonance which the disadvantaged are motivated to defend most 
strongly. In a study based on data from New Zealand, they found that Maori reported lower trust in 
government but perceived ethnic relationships within the society as more fair compared to ethnic 
Europeans. In a similar vein, addressing the substantive quality of measures used for system-justi-
fication attitudes, Trump and White (2015) suggest that social and political institutions utilized in 
Brandt’s (2013) analysis do not sufficiently capture the concept which is usually operationalized via 
meritocratic beliefs. In their own study, they test the hypothesis that it is perception of inequality 
that elevates motivation to system justify. After experimentally manipulating perceived levels of 
(economic and gender) inequality, they fail to observe significant differences in subjects’ subsequent 
answers on measures of general system justification and economic system justification. However, it 
needs to be noted that SJT does not predict motivated defense of all perceived inequalities, but only 
of inequalities that the individual should initially consider unjust.
On the other hand, van der Toorn et al. (2015) suggest that a possible reason behind mixed find-
ings could be the usage of objective rather than subjective status in previous studies. van der Toorn 
and colleagues (including the author of the original hypothesis) thus revised the original hypothesis 
by clarifying that the motivation to defend the standing group hierarchy should be elevated among 
those who experience subjective sense of powerlessness and implicitly consider themselves not in 
control of changing their fortunes within a system they are dependent upon. They further speculated 
that using group membership to infer feelings of powerlessness might confound the relationship 
between disadvantage, status, and feelings of powerlessness. van der Toorn and colleagues then sup-
ported this interpretation with results from five studies, three of them experimental, which directly 
demonstrate the relationship between experience of powerlessness and various measures of political 
and economic system justification. In particular, one’s perceived financial dependence on their job 
predicted the perceived legitimacy of one’s manager (i.e., agreement that the person should strive to 
always follow their manager’s orders) and both experimentally induced and general sense of power-
lessness predicted perceived legitimacy of the social system and of governmental authorities.
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Present Research
The question arising from the discussion above is whether the presumed experienced powerless-
ness of the disadvantaged manifesting as a “status-legitimacy effect” appears systematically across 
populations and, therefore, whether SJT and a status-legitimacy hypothesis can be a useful tool for 
making predictions at the aggregate level. We therefore assess the theorized relationship utilizing 
various operationalizations of both the conditions that should lead to experiences of powerlessness 
and of the attitudes through which the elevated motivation to defend the system should manifest. 
Following Brown-Iannuzzi et al. (2015) and the suggestions of van der Toorn et al. (2015), we ex-
plore potentially different roles of subjective and objective status in the formation of system-legit-
imizing attitudes. The original formulation of status-legitimacy hypothesis focused on the likely 
experiences of members of objectively disadvantaged groups (e.g., the low-income respondents in 
general, the Blacks in American South, or low-income Latinos in the United States). We can then hy-
pothesize that the expected relationship in representative data should be that those from low-income 
backgrounds should be more likely to legitimize existing inequality. The “revised” version of the 
hypothesis by van der Toorn et al. (2015) specifies subjective feelings of powerlessness as the source 
of motivation to system justify. From this we can theorize that it should be those who self-identify as 
occupying low-status positions who would turn to system-legitimizing attitudes.
Reflecting on the findings of Sengupta et al. (2015) and Trump and White (2015), the focus 
is on the legitimization of income inequality as a part of the system that should generate the most 
dissonance among the economically disadvantaged. We consider both the explicit statements and 
indirect measures in order to mitigate the role of self and group interest in the answers. Finally, 
we also distinguish between objective and self-reported measures of contextual inequality and ex-
plore the circumstances which motivate the disadvantaged to defend the status quo. We assume that 
greater objective inequality should be associated with the lack of possibilities for social mobility and 
economic resources for members of low-status groups, thus generating feelings of dependency and 
powerlessness. The perceived amount of inequality should mobilize material self-interest in ways 
consistent with median-voter theorem, thus generating cognitive dissonance among those comparing 
their own outcomes with those at the top. At the same time, the perceived level of inequality should 
also affect personal baselines of inequality ideals via multiple cognitive biases such as anchoring or 
status quo bias (e.g., Trump & White, 2015).
Additionally, in order to examine the core hypothesized consequences of motivation to system 
justify, resistance to change, and acceptance of inequality, we also test whether change in contextual 
inequality correlates with acceptance of income inequality among the low-status participants.
We can then derive the following hypotheses:
H1: People with low objective status will, on average, accept higher levels of economic inequal-
ity when objective or perceived levels of inequality are greater (original version of the status- 
legitimacy hypothesis).
H2: People with low subjective status will, on average, accept higher levels of economic in-
equality when objective or perceived levels of inequality are greater (revised status-legitimacy 
hypothesis).
Conversely, if we expect the disadvantaged to behave rationally, we hypothesize the following:
H3: People with high objective status will, on average, accept greater economic inequality, and 
the contextual level of inequality will be negatively related to acceptance of economic inequality 
(median-voter hypothesis).
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H4: People with high subjective status will, on average, accept greater economic inequality, and 
this relationship will be stronger in contexts which are perceived as more unequal (subjective 
median-voter hypothesis).
Data
The analysis explores representative survey data of 46,448 respondents from 28 countries over 
two decades in three different years (62 country/year combinations) gathered as a part of the social 
inequality module within the framework of ISSP project. Only respondents without missing answers 
to the questions used in all of the forthcoming analyses were retained in the dataset. ISSP uniquely 
offers not only questions on general judgments about inequalities, but also questions asking for the 
respondent’s estimates (or perceptions) of actual salaries earned in certain occupations, as well as for 
the respondent’s suggestions for what people in these occupations should earn. In line with previous 
research, we interpret the latter to be suggestions of earning considered just (Jasso, 2006) or legiti-
mate for the given occupation (Gijsberts, 2002; Trump, 2013).
Measures of Legitimacy of Economic Inequality
Indirect acceptance of inequality is operationalized as (log of) a ratio of a mean of earnings 
suggested as ideal for the two available high-status occupations (ministers and CEOs) to those of 
available low-status occupations, unskilled workers and shop assistants.1 Similar operationalization 
was utilized and extensively discussed in previous research (Kelley & Zagorski, 2004; Trump, 2013). 
Unstandardized coefficients represent percentage changes calculated as e (nx*b) = difference in ideal 
inequality for “n” units of variable x in percentages. We also distinguish between ministers and CEOs 
to capture the distinction between representatives of economic and political systems. In this way, we 
aim to identify the hierarchy to be legitimized, thus conceptually following Sengupta et al. (2015).
Explicit acceptance of inequality is measured with two separate items: “Income differences in 
(R’s country) are too high,” and “Large differences in incomes are necessary for a country’s pros-
perity” (rescaled from a 5-point scale into a 0–1 scale, where 1 suggests strong agreement). These 
questions are meant to tap into explicit judgments on the presence of undue income inequality and 
acceptance of its necessity.
Measures of Status and Controls
Of the status set that should describe the total position of the individual, we will only consider 
objective and subjective economic positions (Merton, 1957). A drawback is that the master status 
may not be aligned with the economic status but with other factors, such as political identity. As is 
standard in income-inequality research, the main measure of objective socioeconomic status of the 
respondent is captured as family income expressed as a (natural log of) the ratio of reported family 
income of the household in relation to mean family income within each country/year (Gijsberts, 
2002; Kuhn, 2011). To measure subjective status, we use self-positioning on a ladder of relative in-
come positions ranging from 1 to 10 (rescaled as a continuous measure on a 0–1 scale). We utilized 
this measure of subjective status instead of self-reported class because it provides more valid ob-
servations, better resolution (10 compared to five categories), and the very word “class” potentially 
introduces ideology-based biases.
1ln[(mean legitimate earnings(ministers, CEOs))/ mean legitimate earnings(unskilled workers, shop assistants)].
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Additionally, we control for years of education (a continuous measure as opposed to a categori-
cal variable denoting highest achieved education) and gender (0 = male; 1 = female). To measure the 
potential influence of personal ideological attitudes and predispositions, we utilize preference for use 
of equity (working hard and doing job well) versus need (having a family or children) as allocation 
principles for determining salaries. Averages of both dimensions (rescaled to 0–1) were subtracted 
from each other (equity–need), thus creating a variable informing us about the preferred allocation 
principle of the given individual, with scores above 0 meaning preference for equity and scores 
below 0 indicating a preference for need.
Measures of Context
To measure perceived contextual inequality, we use (natural logarithm of) perceived ratios of 
two top-earning occupations (ministers and CEOs) to earnings of unskilled workers and shop assis-
tants.2 We also control for mean perceived level of inequality within a given subsample (country- 
year). Objective level of contextual inequality is measured with year-relevant Gini coefficient (Solt, 
2015). To capture other time-related unobserved effects, we include year dummies. Additionally, 
recognizing structural, institutional, and ideological legacies of state-socialism, which earlier re-
search identified as leading to lower acceptance of income inequality among the population, we use 
a dummy variable denoting Eastern European countries (Gijsberts, 2002).
Analysis
We test the hypotheses in a three-level multilevel mixed-effects model recognizing the structure 
of the data in which individuals are nested within country-years, which are nested within coun-
tries. All continuous individual-level independent variables were group-mean centered and contex-
tual-level variables (including aggregate means of individual-level variables) grand-mean centered. 
However, this modeling technique still provides only one common estimate for effects of between 
and within influences of contextual variables (see Schmidt-Catran & Fairbrother, 2015, for a compar-
ison of viable random-effects specifications in multilevel models). In addition, to explore potentially 
differing influences of changes and stability in contextual inequality, we decompose the total effect 
of the Gini index for each country into an over-time mean and within-country change (Fairbrother, 
2014). Using this operationalization, we obtain a “within-countries” “fixed” effect of change in Gini 
and a “between” effect described by mean level of inequality in given countries over time. All models 
were estimated with maximum likelihood. The data were analyzed with mixed command in Stata 
13. Finally, the question of large income differences being necessary for a country’s prosperity was 
only posed in two waves of the survey. A two-level model considering each country-year combina-
tion as a unique context was used in an analysis with this question as the DV. It should be noted that 
since the questionnaire is openly addressing issues of deservingness, economic justice, and income 
inequality, it is possible that motivations of material self-interest may bias the answers in favor of 
rational choice-based models.
Results
The results are summarized in Tables 1–3. In addition to the full model (Table 1, M3B), Table 1 
presents selected intermediate models with computed legitimate ratios of income differences as a 
DV. Tables 2 and 3 present tests of the full model with different explicit statements as DVs and 
decomposition of contextual inequality. Compared to the simplest model utilizing only measures of 
2ln[(mean perceived earnings(ministers, CEOs))/ mean perceived earnings(unskilled workers, shop assistants)].
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objective status and inequality, models including subjective status and perception highlight the cen-
tral role of interpretation for attitudes towards inequality (Table 1, M1 and M2A). For one, the effect 
of the level of objective inequality does explain a significant portion of inequality attitudes after 
inclusion of perceived amounts of inequality. The main effects in the full model (M3B) are largely in 
expected and intuitive directions. Measures of objective and subjective status are positively related to 
the acceptance of income inequality, as is ideological preference for equity over need. As tested hy-
potheses focus primarily on contextual moderation, we turn to their assessment in the following part.





Differences in Incomes too 
Large
Structural variables Family Income .052 (.001) −.017 (.004)
Education .01 (.001) −.002 (.000)
Gender −.08 (.005) .024 (.002)
Age .005 (.000) .0003 (.000)
“Subjective variables” Subjective status .268 (.028) −.152 (.015)
Perceived inequality 
(individual)
.468 (.003) .024 (.001)
Equity/Need .21 (.01) −.077 (.004)
Context-level variables Perceived inequality 
(national mean)
.446 (.044) .045 (.015)
Gini (between) .01 (.006)+ −.001 (.002)
Gini(within) .003 (.01) .012 (.004)
Eastern Europe −.034 (.082) .055 (.029)
1992 (reference) 1999 .014 (.039) −.0156 (.014)
2009 −.041 (.057) −.039 (.02)+
Family Income .094 (.115) .162 (.04)
Education −.006 (.016) −.003 (.006)
Gender −.395 (.39) .085 (.136)
Age .001 (.008) .004 (.003)+
Subjective status .058 (.431) −.329 (.151)
Equity/Need .61 (.28) −.166 (.099)+
Interaction effects
Gini (between) Family Income −.002 (.001) .002 (.001)
Subjective status −.011 (.004) .008 (.002)
Gini (within) Family Income −001 (.004) .005 (.002)
Subjective status .03 (.013) −.003 (.005)
Perceived Inequality Family Income −.015 (.004) −.003 (.002)+
Subjective status .165 (.018) .004 (.007)
constant 1.493 (.054) .796 (.019)
Level 1 n 48,802 48,255
Level 2 n 64 64
Level 3 n 28 28
AIC 88,793.6 −11,203.34
BIC 89,083.85 −10,913.46
ICC country .036 (.015) .037 (.014)
ICC wave/country .053 (.013) .052 (.013)
Note. Presented are unstandardized coefficient; numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Dependent variable is legitimate 
level of income inequality calculated as log of ratio of suggested incomes for ministers and CEOs to suggested incomes for 
unskilled workers and shop assistants. Perceived inequality is expressed as a log of a ratio constructed analogical to legitimate 
inequality. Specification of the random part of the model: Slopes for family income and subjective status were allowed to vary 
in models M9 and M10. Effects significantly different from zero at p < .05 are bolded. Effects significantly different from zero 
at p < .1 are denoted with +. Data: ISSP 1992, 1999, and 2009.
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The first tested hypothesis was that people in low objective status will be more likely to accept 
inequality in contexts that may generate more dissonance. In the model testing indirect attitudes, 
it is only the amount of perceived inequality that moderates the relationship between inequality 
ideals and objective status (Table 1, M3B). Importantly, the relationship is present for incomes of 
ministers and not for CEOs, which suggests that inequalities within an “economic system” generate 
less internal conflict and thus less dissonance to resolve than inequalities within a political system 
(Table 2, M4A-B). Further supporting the hypothesis is that the negative interaction effect is only 
present in countries with above-average (sample-wise) Gini coefficient (Table 2, M5A-B). Similarly, 
when explicit statements judging presence and usefulness of income differences are considered, the 
effect only manifests in more unequal contexts (Table 2, M6-M7). Overall, the data indicate that both 
higher objective and perceived inequality may lead to acceptance of the unequal status quo among 
those presumably experiencing the greatest dissonance (people in low objective status). However, the 
results suggest that there is a difference between justifying compensation of economic and political 
representatives (H1).
The powerlessness hypothesis stated people who consider themselves to be in low status may 
accept the unequal arrangements when they feel greater feelings of dependency on the system. Such 
emotions should be elicited more often in unequal contexts that don’t offer many avenues for alter-
native mobility paths. People with lower reported social status were more likely to accept higher 
income differences in objectively more unequal contexts, albeit only for ministers and not for CEOs 
(Table 1, M1; Table 2, M4B). Similarly to Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 2 is only supported in highly 
unequal countries (Table 1, M5B). It is therefore possible that a certain level of inequality is neces-
sary to generate amounts of dissonance not reconcilable without engaging in disproportionate system 
justification. Similar results were found when examining economic attitudes measured with explicit 
judgments as DVs (Table 2, M6-M7). In sum, the proposition that it is the subjective experience of 
powerlessness that leads people to perceive the status quo as fair is supported only in more unequal 
contexts, and even less so when judging the necessity of income inequality (H2).
As hypothesized in the median-voter theorem (H3), objective status, measured as family in-
come, correlates positively with attitudes supporting greater inequality or less redistribution. Median 
voter hypothesis, however, receives support only at the microlevel as the overall level of inequality 
within a country is not negatively related to support for inequality for neither indirectly nor explicitly 
measured ideals (Table 1, M3). In comparison to the better off, the disadvantaged in more unequal 
countries are less likely to agree with a statement that income differences in a country are too large 
(Table 2, M7). There is also no main effect of family income on the statement that large differences 
in income are necessary for a country’s prosperity.
A toned-down, or subjective, version of the median voter hypothesis, Hypothesis 4, was that 
those who believe they are the overall winners within the status quo are more likely to oppose redis-
tribution and justify inequality. Overall, the hypothesis is supported with the main effect of subjective 
status being strongly significant across all models. When contextual moderation is taken into con-
sideration, the data support the hypothesis when indirect attitudes are considered as the DV (Table 1, 
M3B). On the other hand, greater perceived inequality does not lead to perceived necessity of large 
income differences, nor to the denial of their excessive presence among those who place themselves 
as higher on the income ladder (Table 2, M6–M7).
Finally, we introduced a model testing the effects of both the “changes” and of the “average dif-
ferences” in levels of contextual inequality (Table 3, M9–M10). The model shows that both the long 
term average inequality and the increase in inequality (measured between the periods when data was 
gathered) reduced differences in assessment of whether “income differences are too large” between 
those in objectively higher and lower status, thus supporting Hypothesis 1. This suggests that the 
effect originally proposed in the status-legitimacy hypothesis (judgment that the society is fair—or 
rather not excessively unfair) holds in objectively more unequal contexts as well as in societies 
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experiencing increases in inequality. The disadvantaged seem to adjust to high levels of inequality 
over time (Table 3, M10). Conversely, people with low subjective status seem to only accept rela-
tively “long-term” levels of inequality as indicated by positive interaction between change in Gini 
and subjective status in Table 3 (M9).
Our findings thus corroborate the wealth of empirical evidence in which the subjective potential 
victims of change rally in order to protect their interests at first and accepting the novel status quo 
only with the passing of time.
Discussion
The question of members of low-status groups supporting unequal social arrangements presents 
a puzzle that is challenging to explain within the intuitive frameworks of people behaving according 
to economic rationality. The SJT offers an explanation that people are motivated to have positive 
attitudes towards existing social systems—and even more so if such systems are putting them in 
a disadvantage. Various interpretations of this proposition posit powerlessness and experiences of 
being disadvantaged as immediate drivers of the sometimes counter-intuitive motivation to system 
justify (Sengupta et al., 2015; van der Toorn et al., 2015). Experimental research shows that there are 
multiple ways to increase the said motivation (van der Toorn et al., 2011), but most findings from 
comparative national samples provide only mixed support for the hypothesis (Brandt, 2013; Milojev, 
Greaves, Osborne, & Sibley, 2015; Trump & White, 2015).
The goal of this article was to examine the conditions under which the paradoxical effect of the 
disadvantaged justifying the status quo manifests and assesses whether such conditions are consis-
tent with the predictions originally proposed by Jost et al. (2003) and clarified in van der Toorn et al. 
(2015). Focusing on the economic dimension of social systems, consistent with the intuitive predic-
tions of models expecting people to behave more or less as rational actors, we found that, on aver-
age, people hold attitudes that are reasonably in line with intuitive expectations of the median-voter 
model and that both objective and subjective status are positively related to acceptance of inequality.
At the same time, however, and in line with predictions of the original formulation of status-le-
gitimacy hypothesis, both objective and perceived amount of inequality moderate the relationship 
between objective (and to some degree also subjective) status and support for unequal status quo. 
In a rather clear support of the original version of Hypothesis 1, it was in the most unequal contexts 
where people in objectively lower socioeconomic positions were more likely than those from more 
affluent households to agree with a statement that large differences in incomes are necessary for a 
country’s prosperity (Figure 1) and least likely to agree with a statement that income differences in 
the country are too large (Figure 2).
Consistent with predictions of the original formulation of the status-legitimacy hypothesis, this 
indicates that objective status is a better predictor the status-legitimacy effect. The proposed interme-
diate mechanism of experiences of powerlessness and dependency may serve as a fitting explanation 
for obtained results. People in less unequal countries, in which levels of redistribution are presum-
ably higher, may feel less pressured to have positive attitudes towards economic inequality simply 
due to redistribution already being the dominant norm in the given society. Likewise, people in 
countries where redistribution is greater may feel less dependent on their current low-paying jobs, 
thus experiencing less dependency and powerlessness vis-à-vis considerations of following alterna-
tive options. This interpretation is further supported in a model in which health-care expenditures are 
used as a proxy for institutionalized level of redistribution (Table 2, M8).3
On the other hand, the general mechanism that is proposed to drive system-justifying attitudes 
may shed light on a seemingly opposite phenomenon, an increasing rise in popularity of populist 
3Expenditures health care expressed as percentage of GDP; taken from Quality of Government databases from University of 
Gothenburg.
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movements across the globe. One of the often-cited sources of support for current populist and au-
thoritarian movements is economic anxiety coupled with loss of faith and confidence in the system 
or in “politics as usual” (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). However, in what is one of the most salient 
issues of the time, populism researchers studying a related question of how people come to vote for 
parties that seemingly aim to upend the standing order have repeatedly found economic insecurity 
to be an insufficient explanation for support of the populist right (Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Mols 
& Jetten, 2018; Oesch, 2008; Rooduijn, 2018). Although not directly tackling the question of “who 
Figure 1. Marginal effects of family income depending on contextual inequality (Gini) on agreement with the statement that 
large income differences are necessary for the country’s prosperity.
Figure 2. Marginal effects of family income depending on contextual inequality (Gini) on agreement with the statement that 
income differences in the respondent’s country are too large.
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votes who,” our results nevertheless support SJT’s suggestions of possible reasons for why the most 
disadvantaged and vulnerable groups would prefer stability over radical change or attempts for a 
return to the golden past.
Indeed, populist narratives may not be as appealing to the very worse off because they are often 
focused on enemies, like foreigners or corrupt elites, whose presumed corrupting influence on the 
society simply cannot take much away from those who do not have much to lose. In other words, 
and consistent with the idea that people pay more attention to potential losses than potential gains, 
it could be that the worse off feel less motivated to change the system because keeping it in place 
is not perceived as leading to further losses in their social status. Such interpretation would be also 
consistent with the observed moderation of this relationship by the extent of country-level inequality, 
simply because even the worse off in many of the developed countries enjoy benefits of the local 
welfare system and relative affluence compared to those from the countries with less developed 
welfare systems.
On the other hand, the results of this study also point to a decisive importance of subjective be-
liefs about both the state of the world and one’s own position in regard to the formation of attitudes 
towards the prevailing socioeconomic order. As our results show, and consistent with research on the 
role of subjective perceptions in the populism literature (Jetten, Mols, Healy, & Spears, 2017), those 
who think they are falling behind tend to reject increases in inequality and rising salaries among the 
elite. One of the explanations consistent with SJT’s perspective could be that the feeling of falling 
behind activates ego and group identities, and these buffer against the motivation to defend the status 
quo. Taken together, there are indications of a decline of the belief in the capability of the government 
to reign in the consequences of globalization and fairly regulate and redistribute the accrued surplus. 
In countries where inequalities are (at least subjectively) felt the most, those who do not see or no 
longer believe in possible alternatives may be motivated to seek certainty by affirmation of existing 
or already-known orders rather than by risking an approach oriented towards further change.
Limitations and Future Directions
Our approach also has its limitations. The utilized data are not a true panel, thus limiting our 
ability to infer conclusions about effects of changes in (perceived) inequality on attitudes of par-
ticular individuals. Also, the measures of system-justifying attitudes and subjective experience of 
powerlessness (which was proposed to be increasing the motivation to endorse the status quo) are 
not without problems. First, the questionnaire openly addressed issues of fairness and inequality, 
something which should make self and group interest salient and thus compete with motivation 
to defend the system. Second, using objective or subjective status is not an ideal way of approxi-
mating likelihood of experiences of powerlessness and dissonance. Questions about the perceived 
ability to reach one’s goals could be devised and tested to measure powerlessness in cross-cultural 
surveys.
Further research could then focus on ascertaining whether endorsement of unequal arrange-
ments and inequality-justifying attitudes are direct consequences of a limited amount of perceived 
general availability of options to reach one’s goals (dependency) or of perceived inability to utilize 
those said options (powerlessness).
Similarly, while there was some unexpected support of inequality among those with low sub-
jective status in more unequal contexts, objective status seemed to be more clearly related to the 
theorized phenomenon. Subsequent theoretical and experimental work on the status-legitimacy hy-
pothesis should address why experiences of powerlessness—presumed to be eliciting motivation to 
system justify among the disadvantaged—do not translate into lower self-reported status.
Finally, while we have only directly tested hypotheses related to the economic dimensions, test-
ing the support of other hierarchies and institutions in a similar manner could help reconcile the 
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questions opened up by this research, such as whether people tend to defend some hierarchies more 
than others. If experienced powerlessness motivates not only the legitimization of status quo, but 
also of (unequal) hierarchies in general, it could help explain the source of the appeal that populist 
and strongman types of leaders have for the people who feel powerless and lacking control over their 
lives.
Concluding Remarks
Overall, we found stronger support for a notion that experiences tied to objective, rather than 
subjective, low status may motivate people to defend experienced, unequal economic arrangements, 
while the interpretation that subjective status might be a better predictor of status-legitimacy effect 
has received only a limited support in data covering 28 countries over two decades. This presents 
support for the original claim of Jost et al. (2003) and its reading by Sengupta et al. (2015). However, 
Sengupta et al.’s reading, that it is the particular hierarchy responsible for one’s disadvantaged po-
sition that will be justified, is not supported by a positive effect of interaction between perceived 
inequality and objective status on the assessment of differences in incomes being too large. Neither 
is it supported by objectively low-status respondents defending the incomes of ministers, rather than 
CEOs, in more unequal contexts. Such results point to people selectively defending the unequal hier-
archies and institutional arrangements, but not those that might be seen as exacerbating or profiting 
from their disadvantaged positions.
To assess the conditions in which status-legitimacy effect manifests, we have differentiated be-
tween objective and subjective status and between objective and perceived inequality in incomes. We 
have explored the relationships of relevant constructs utilizing cross-cultural representative survey 
data. Our design has multiple advantages over previous research. First, by explicitly distinguishing 
between subjective and objective status, we are able to address the confusion stemming from the 
usage of the elusive concept of status and further clarified where to look for the feelings of pow-
erlessness that van der Toorn et al. (2015) found to be motivating legitimization of the status quo. 
We show that objective disadvantage, and less so subjective disadvantage, translate into heightened 
motivation to defend the system in highly unequal contexts. Secondly, we utilize both indirect and 
explicit attitudes towards income inequality in order to assess the likely extent of acceptance of 
status quo among the participants. The results point to different mechanisms motivating the accep-
tance of inequality indirectly defined via ratios of earnings of particular occupations and agreements 
with explicit statements judging presence and usefulness of differences in incomes. In addition, we 
clearly show that earnings for top market and political occupational positions are justified differently, 
presumably due to generating different amounts of dissonance. Third, we model temporal changes 
in contextual inequality. Thus, while we can conclude that high income inequality is related to in-
creased likelihood of injuctification (a tendency to see the way things are as the way things should 
be) among the disadvantaged, we are also able to show that the opposite is the case among the sub-
jectively low status when income inequality increases in the medium term. Finally, we have utilized 
nationally representative data gathered over multiple decades from countries all over the world, thus 
increasing the generalizability of our findings.
The explicit attention of this study on the objective and subjective allows us to address the possi-
ble consequences of rising economic inequality for how people perceive the legitimacy of economic 
and political arrangements and institutions. While the puzzling tendency of some of the members of 
the lower strata (and recently of the shrinking middle class) to protect the status quo through support 
of economically right-wing parties may remain unanswered for the time being, our results bring for-
ward the possible role of the perceived lack of options or ability to act on these (i.e., powerlessness).
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